This paper exploits the surge in Chinese exports from 1994 to 2004 as a natural experiment to evaluate the effects of an exogenous shock from competition on Mexican producers, and how the emergence of Chinese exports on world markets effects existing producers. The effect of this competition operates as selection at both firm and product-level as its impact is highly heterogeneous both on the intensive and extensive margins. Sales of smaller plants and more marginal products are compressed and are more likely to exit, while larger plants and products exhibit an opposite effect. Similar results hold both on the domestic market as well as for competition facing Mexican exporters on a third market
Introduction
Between 1990 and 2007 Chinese exports grew from 62 billions USD to 1.2 trillions USD, at the staggering average rate of about 20 percent per year. According to WTO data China "'is set to overtake Germany as the largest goods exporter in 2009"'. 1 The emergence of China and its impact on producers worldwide has been the focus of the attention of both policy-makers and researchers. At the same time, policy makers concerned about the adverse consequences of such shock have been voicing their concerns and argued for the importance of protecting their industries. 2 The emergence of China has caused angst among policy-makers on all continents and at all levels of development. As argued in Winters and Yusuf (2007) , however, in the near term there is probably relatively little to fear for OECD countries because their specialization in sophisticated products and in capital goods insulates their main producers from much of the competition. The pressure on the less sophisticated sectors and firms is in some sense pushing in the direction of improved overall economic performance by speeding up creative destruction. Similarly, policy-makers in low income countries often worry that China will leave no room for them in the markets for labor-intensive manufactures, but in fact as China becomes richer, its comparative advantage is shifting away from the simplest goods towards a middle range. Thus low income countries are also relatively insulated from the force of Chinese competition. Arguably the most direct competition is on middle-income countries whose established positions in manufactured markets have come under threat. This is the focus of this paper.
The main contributions presented are the closure of two gaps in the literature. On the one hand we provide a detailed investigation of the causal impact of competition on the intensive and extensive margin of products in addition to plants. On the other hand we evaluate this same impact on a third country market. 3 On both these markets we find strong heterogeneous effects of the competition shock on the extensive (firm exit and survival) and intensive (sales of plants) margin of plants. We also find evidence of product reallocation within plants as competition pressures them to focus on their core competencies (in this context see also Iacovone, Javorcik (2008) , ).
We come to these results by treating the emergence of China on the export markets as a natural 1 Quoted from the Financial Times article "'China set to be biggest exporter"', published on July 23, 2009 by Frances Williams. 2 Some examples from the media to highlight this point: "'[We] must not repeat the mistakes of the nineties, when an 'invasion' of Chinese products destroyed entire sectors of our industry [...]"' (Medium Enterprises Association of Argentina, April 6, 2004) , or: "'I made it very clear to Minister Bo Xilai that we will take the legal steps to give Brazilian industry the right to protect itself"' (Brazilian minister for Industry, Development and Commerce after meeting with his Chinese counterpart, October 4, 2005 .) 3 We should underscore that the share of Mexican exports to the US is larger than 85%, in this sense we are analyzing the impact on the near universe of the Mexican exports. experiment of a strong and sudden surge of competition on manufacturing producers of Mexico. As depicted in figure 1 the growth rate of Chinese exports to Mexico and the United States increased substantially in value and share during the period considered. This sizeable growth was matched by a moderate increase of trade flows into the other direction; the share of exports from Mexico to China increased from 1.9 to 2.8 percent from 1994 to 2004. 4 Hence we interpret the situation at hand as a unilateral trade shock and not a mutual trade expansion.
Mexico is one of the countries that is likely to be effected strongly by Mexican competition, given that within NAFTA Mexico has had a comparative advantage for the production of labor intensive goods. Given that the large majority of Mexican exports go to the United States, the choice of country also allows us to go beyond domestic competition and to study the impact of the Chinese export shock on export markets (ie. the United States), which to our knowledge has not been done before. The objective of this study is to provide an example of how trade can work as a force of creative destruction that leads to competition enhancing readjustments within and across firms. For this reason we focus on both reallocation between firms and within firms, at product level.
There have been several recent studies that investigate the impact of Chinese competition on sectoral level. 5 These studies have shown where the pressure has arisen and its final effect, but they are not able to address the details of how economies adjust to this pressure. Adjustment is undertaken by firms which find their market positions eroded and it is only by studying firms that we are able to see whether Chinese competition induces an active response in terms of, say, innovation, introducing new products or giving up on old ones, new investment, etc, or a passive one in terms of cuts in investment and employment. And only firm level analysis can see whether competition undermines the heart of an industry or merely speeds up the decline of its periphery. These answers are important missing elements in the discussion of the full impact of Chine emergence on incomes and growth.
Firm-level studies of Chinese competition are rare. Among the few examples are Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) or Fernandes and Paunov (2008) . However, none of the existing studies investigates the impact of competition on product level, or analyzes the impact of Chinese competition at firm-or product-level in a third export market.
In addition to these findings our results are also of relevance for firms and policy makers alike. We show how the rise of China affected production patterns in Mexico, and suggest that larger, more productive firms and products are relatively shielded against the adverse effects that this competition poses.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some related literature, section 3 presents a toy model that motivates our analysis, section 4 describes the applied data and strategy. Section 5 describes the results of the investigation, and section 6 evaluates some additional explanations that might be brought forward. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Our work is related to several areas of research. Most studies analyzing the impact of the emergence of China on the world markets deal with the effect on developed countries, for which the pressure has a possibly constructive intersectoral effect. We ask about a country whose comparative advantage lies firmly in the same sort of sectors and sophistication as China's, as Mexicos comparative advantage within NAFTA lies in labor intensive goods.
First, there exists a large number of studies that rely on sectoral trade flows data to assess the competition threat from Chinese exports to Latin American producers (Freund, Ozden (2006) 2005)). Other studies have evaluated the impact Chinese exports on wages and employment for various parts of Latin America, see Levinsohn (1999) Pavcnik (2002) for Chile. A sectoral study of the effects that Chinese imports to the US had on Mexican imports to the US finds some evidence for crowding out on this third market (see Iranzo and Ma (2006) ). In a broad study Jenkins, Dussel Peters and Mesquite Moreira (2008) suspect that winners as well as losers should be expected in Latin America as a consequence of China's emergence.
Previous firm level studies highlight that trade not only hurts producers but also pushes them to improve their efficiency and organization. Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2008) find that imports from China to Europe increase the innovative activity of surviving firms in Europe, while they decrease the chances of survival and employment. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2004) show that Chinese competition in the US pushes high wage and high skill companies, and causes the decline of low wage and low skill industries. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) investigate how firms react to exposure to international trade and show that plant survival and growth are negatively correlated with competition, but skill intensity, and industry switching positively. 6 The question of the impact of trade on product level and within-firm reallocations however is with a few exceptions unexplored. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009a) find that the impact of product switching on US manufacturing growth is as large as that of firm exit and entry to the market, Baldwin and Gu (2005) find evidence that competition reduces diversification of Canadian producers. Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik and Neary (2009) show that Mexican producers tend react to NAFTA trade liberalization by focusing on their core competencies. Fernandes and Paunov (2008) present evidence of product upgrading in response to competitive pressure among Chilean producers.
Further numerous theoretical articles in the emerging trade models on multi-product firms are closely related to our analysis. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009b) create a model of multi-product firms that predicts the demise of the less productive firms and products resulting from trade liberalization. The model by suggests that within-firm adjustments, as a consequence of trade reforms might generate substantial gains due to higher efficiency. Related models include Melitz (2003) Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2009) is the model most closely related to our study as it extends Melitz and Ottaviano (2009) by introducing a multi-product dimension and thus give clear predictions on the effects of a unilateral increase of competition. They find that domestically an increase in the competitive pressure leads firms to drop their marginal products (the ones that also have a lower share in production), and reallocate their resources to an increased production of the remaining goods. The inter-firm reallocations generate an additional aggregate productivity increase. For export markets they predict that more competition will lead to a dropping of the less substantial products and firms. In its short run prediction this model is fully consistent with our empirical results.
Model
In great part, the competitive success of Chinese exports results from their ability to undercut the prices charged by other suppliers (as argued by among others Broda and Romalis (2009)). In a simple model we want to illustrate that if cost undercutting is the main characteristic of Chinese exports, we might expect heterogeneous results for firms and products on the Mexican market. While this toy model is not a rich description of the economy, it is a simple guide for the empirical investigation, and contains a general way to think about unilateral competition.
Consider a Mexican retailer i that sells a good of a certain quality. Initially the store sells only a domestic product, that it obtains from a Mexican producer at costs c H . For our argument it is irrelevant how the plant producing the item determines the price at which it sells the product. We just assume that this price is increasing in marginal costs.
We further define that if one domestic firm has lower costs than another for the same product at the same quality, the lower cost firm has production advantages (which might consist for example of a better management or lower production costs), as in Melitz (2003) . We refer to these differences as higher productivity, and think of the more productive firm as one that can deliver equal quality for a lower price. As in the literature on multi-product firms we further assume that the costs of a product contain an element of firm productivity, such that the costs of a product of a given firm are positively correlated, conditional on product differences. Thus the price at which a producer offers a good might be characterized as the product from a random draw from a product productivity distribution and a firm productivity distribution, or in our case we may write c H = f (ϕ F , ϕ P ), where ϕ F denotes a firm productivity, and ϕ P a product productivity (this assumption was used for example in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009)).
The retailer has local monopoly power, and sells the good at price p i (c H ) ≥ c H to the local consumers, from which it faces a downward sloping demand. We assume the price function p(c) to be increasing in costs. The profits from selling the domestic product are in one period equal to (p i (c H ) − c H )q H i , where q H i is the optimal quantity of the product sold if the purchase price to the store is c H . The store discounts future periods with the discount factor δ, which is assumed to be between zero and one. Then present plus discounted future profits are equal to:
We consider the situation in which a foreign competitor (from China) enters the market to compete with the domestic producer by delivering a perfect substitute for that good at cost c F . We assume that the Chinese competitors also take their productivity from a random distribution and after observing their productivity decide if they want to enter the Mexican market or not. If the foreign competitor offers a lower price than the local producer (c F < c H ), the retailer might consider switching supplier. We assume that store i can undertake such a change for the fixed switching cost f i . We assume the switching costs f i to be heterogeneous across stores. A varying cost element emerges if it is costly to exit existing contracts, and these existing contracts have different expiry dates. Another reason for heterogeneity in switch costs is, that the costs for writing different contracts with the new suppliers will also depend on the nature and structure of the retailer, or variation in the difficulty to overcome language barriers. Finally, different levels of risk aversion or judgment of the reliability of the new producer might again lead to different expectations of the switching cost. Hence if N stores sell a similar product, a situation could emerge in which some of the stores change the suppliers while others do not.
The retailer changes supplier if [(p
and is indifferent between changing or not if the inequality is an equality. If c F < c H the left hand side of the inequality must be greater than zero, since even at initial quantities this cost reduction would result in greater profit for the store. Using a similar argument it can be shown that profits of store i must be decreasing in costs c.
From this simple setting, we generate several propositions: Proposition 1: A product from a more productive firm sells at larger quantities. By definition we characterize a more productive product as one that is passed on to the stores at lower costs conditional on quality. Given the assumptions of a downward sloping demand and a price function p(c) that is increasing in costs, a lower cost product will be sold at a lower price p i (c H ) conditional on the market for that product, and hence at higher quantities.
Proposition 2: A more productive firm sells larger quantities. If a high and a low productivity firm produce the same number of products, from proposition 1 the more productive firm must sell larger overall quantities. Given downward sloping demand in the market of each good, a productive firm with lower expected costs is more likely to sell in addition also a higher number of products.
Proposition 3: Entry of a competitor is more likely to cause smaller products to exit from the market. Everything equal, the greater the cost difference between the domestic and the foreign producer (c F − c H ) is, the more likely is a store to switch to the foreign producers. Conditional on product, a product with higher costs is smaller (proposition 1), hence smaller products are more likely to be dropped as a competitor enters the market.
Proposition 4: Entry of a competitor is more likely to cause smaller firms to exit the market. A firm exits the market if all its products do. Hence from proposition 2 and 3 the statement must hold.
Proposition 5: Conditional on survival, entry of a competitor reduces sales of a small product more than sales of a large product. In this model we think of sales reduction as a partial replacement of the Mexican product by some retailers, and not by others due to differences in the fixed costs f i . Since a replacement by all stores is more likely for the small products (proposition 3), also the replacement by some of the stores must be more likely.
Proposition 6: Conditional on survival, entry of a competitor reduces sales of a small firm more than sales of a large firm. The same argument as in proposition 5 can be made with respect to proposition 4.
These propositions coincide largely with predictions made by the emerging models on multiproduct firms in international trade referenced in the literature section. From this simple model we take the motivation to focus on product and firm exit as well as sales as interesting dependent variables, and expect a heterogeneous effect across products and firms of different size. The model might also be used to predict the effects of competition on a shared third market also, hence we do not expect the results for Mexican exporters on the export market to be very different from the domestic effects.
This model also creates an incentive to upgrade productivity for the established producers when faced with competition. Such a relationship was found by Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2008) for European manufacturing firms. Thus our finding (see section 5) that large firms grow as a reaction to Chinese competition is not inconsistent with the model sketched.
Data and Empirical Strategy
Mexico is one of the countries most intensely affected by the emergence of Chinese exports (see Freund and Ozden (2006) , Hanson and Robertson (2007) ). Between 1994 and 2004 the value of Chinese imports to Mexico increased exponentially from 0.5 to 14.4 billion USD, which corresponds to an increase of the share of Chinese imports in total imports from 0.6 to 7.3 percent (see graph 1, source: COMTRADE). In the same period the imports to the US increased from 41 to 201 billion USD, which corresponds to an increase from 6 to 14 percent of imports and reflects a substantial impact to the US market.
To investigate this relationship further we rely on the Monthly Industrial Survey (EIM) data on Mexican plants provided by the Mexican Institute of Statistics (INEGI) which covers about 85 percent of Mexican industrial output. This unique survey contains detailed information on sales and exports of each of the products manufactured by Mexican plants as well as information on employment broken down by skills. 7 . Further, we use trade data from COMTRADE at HS-1996. 8 Because the production database relies on the Mexican Industrial Classification CMAP-1994 (Clasificacin Mexicana de Actividades y Productos) at product level (i.e. 8-digit), while the trade data is based on the HS-1996 classification provided by the World Custom Organization at 6-digit level we match the individual product code manually using its description. 9 In cases when a correspondence was not found we exclude those products from our dataset. Whenever more than one HS code corresponds to one CMAP product we use the average trade value across the different HS codes.
After merging the trade and plant-product level datasets we are left with information on 2744 individual products and a number of plants varying between 6219 and 4439 because of attrition during our sample period (from 1994 to 2004). The main variables of this dataset are described in table 2. The specific measure of exposure to foreign competition at individual plant-productlevel we apply is the share of Chinese in total imports in the market concerned, while on plant 7 These datasets have been used and described in previous studies, see for example Iacovone 2008b and Iacovone and Javorcik 2008 8 For the bilateral trade transaction we rely on the reported imports since it is generally believed that the importer-reported data tend to be more accurate. 9 We conduct the match of these databases relying on the English and Spanish HS 1996 classification obtained from the Export Helpdesk of the European Union (Export Helpdesk, 2009) and the Spanish language HS classification obtained from the SICA project from the Ecuadorian Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (SICA, 2009). level we compute the weighted average of this measure for the produced products of each plant, and the weights are equal to the sales share of each product.
Using this dataset we estimate the following equation:
where y it is a plant specific outcome variable of interest for plant i at time t, Z it a measure of the Chinese competition shock, X it a set of control variables and Z it x it the interaction of the Chinese competition with x it , a subset of X it . Several other studies have used the import penetration rate from China or broader classes of low-wage countries, for example Broda, Romalis (2009), Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) or Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2008). λD t denotes a year fixed effect and µF i is a plant fixed effect. 10 Our measure of Chinese competition Z it−1 is the share of Chinese in total imports to either the US or Mexico. The control variables we use are the value of total imports, the size of plants, a Herfindahl index of product market competition the export share and the ratio of white to blue collar workers (skill share).
We estimate a similar model to investigate the effect on product level. The only difference is that we rewrite the equation in terms of product i, which involves product specific outcomes, control variables on product and plant level, and plant-product specific fixed effects. Generally we cluster standard errors on the level at which we observe the competition from China. 11
Aware of the potential endogeneity concerns that could bias our estimates of β 1 and β 2 , our main variable of interests, we rely on instrumental variable estimators to tackle for the possible exogeneity of Z it . As instruments we use Chinese exports to the EU and separately Chinese exports to the world excluding US and the EU. Further we create the interactions of these export numbers with x it which provides us with additional instruments for the regressions that involve interaction terms.
A potential concern about the exogeneity of the instruments is that common trends might affect both Chinese exports and Mexican firms. However, as is widely believed, at the heart of the rise of China lie policies such as the relaxation of prohibitations of economic activities which encouraged activity, stronger property rights and improvements of governance (see Keefer (2007) or Huang (2003)).
Another concern is that plants and products affected by competition from China might differ initially from those that are not. As depicted in figure 1, Chinese trade to Mexico increased considerably after 1998, the Chinese shock could be dated for the period after. We create an indicator of firms that were affected by Chinese competition during the years 1998-2004, and regress log sales on firm level for the years 1994-1998 on that variable. In this sample of over 26.000 observations we do not find initial sales differences between firms facing later competition and firms that do not (with a p-value of 0.912). 12 A final concern is that when we estimate the equation with sales as outcome, we use a lagdependent variable and an interacted lag-dependent variable in panel data with fixed effects. As shown by Nickell (1981) , the coefficient on the lagged variable is likely downward biased. The size of the bias, and in particular the bias for the interacted variable is unknown. In Appendix 1 we run a simulation to show that the lag-dependent variable, its interaction and the exogenous variable used in the interaction are all three biased towards zero, hence our results are likely to underestimate the true size and significance of the impact in these regressions.
Results

Sectoral level
First we investigate the relationship of Mexican competition and sales at sectoral level, for which we aggregate the data to six digit CMAP level (table 3 ). In the OLS regressions we find no significant effect of the Chinese import share on sales in Mexico on sectoral level. This is in line with the results of other studies involving aggregate data, which also find a small or insignificant impact (for example Wood and Mayer (2009)).
However, there is a positive effect of the Chinese import share to the US on exports of Mexican plants to the US. The instrumental variable estimates are negative and significant at 1 percent level for both the export and the domestic market. The first stage of the IV estimates shows a strong correlation with the instruments, and a Sargan test of exogeneity of the instruments and a test of underidentification do not indicate invalidation of either. Thus we find evidence of competitive pressure of Mexican manufactures due to Chinese competition both domestically and in the third market. The difference between the OLS and the IV regressions highlights the need to take into account endogeneity problems.
Our argument is, however, that these results at sectoral level hide an important amount of heterogeneity at firm and product level. With this objective in mind we move to a finer degree of disaggregation and investigate the impact of Chinese competition on both the extensive and intensive margin, and on plant and product level.
Plant level regressions
In all the following regressions we exclude some data outliers such as plants reporting to export more than they what sell overall and plants characterized by extreme values in the rates of Chinese imports growth. 13 At plant level we first investigate the relationship between the Chinese competition and plant exit from the market (see table 4 ) for the OLS and table 4 for the IV results and the first stages.
The plant exit variable used as an outcome in table 4 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a plant has positive sales at times t − 1 and t, and no sales at time t + 1, and zero otherwise. Hence this variable indicates the year during which a plant leaves the market. We control for the following lagged variables on plant level: the log total imports to Mexico, log total sales of the plant, the Herfindahl index as a proxy for sectoral competition (a measure which is also a weighted mean of the competition for each of the product manufactured by the plants), the plant's export share and the ratio of white to blue collar workers. Additionally we include plant and year fixed effects. This rich set of control variables allows us to condition the results on numerous sources of differences of the Mexican firms and thus to eliminate noise.
In the first column we find that when excluding the main interaction term between size and Chinese competition, in this specification Chinese domestic competition in (t − 1) has no significant conditional mean effect on plant exit in the OLS regressions, a result which is confirmed in the IV regression. The second column presents the results with an interaction of Chinese competition with the Herfindahl index of product competition, which is in OLS insignificant.
In the third column we find that more export oriented plants are less likely to exit as a result of competition, but this result is not significant in IV estimation.
Finally we include an interaction between plant sales and Chinese competition (forth column -EU -US" shows the export share of China to the world with the exception of the EU and the US, and "China exp EU" shows the export value of China to the EU. The terms "'interaction instrument 1"' and "'interaction instrument 2"' are the interactions of these instruments with the variables interacted in the IV regressions. 15 The p-value of the Sargan test of exogeneity of instruments, the p-value of a test of underidentification and the F-value of the first stage are also displayed. The F-statistic suggests a strong explanatory power of the first stage, with strong positive correlation of exports to the EU and to the rest of the world with Chinese exports to Mexico. The Sargan test of exogeneity does not suggest a problem of endogeneity.
We repeat a similar estimation with outcome variable plant exit from export market in tables 5 (OLS) and 5 (IV and first stage). In these regressions we focus on the subset of firms that have a positive export share only, and analyze how the shock of Chinese exports to the US affected their likelihood of exiting from export markets. As before we control for log imports to the US, competition, firm size, the skill share and the export share of firms. A similar pattern emerges: An increase of Chinese competitive pressures in the export market does not increase the probability of Mexican plants withdrawing from exports in the first column. This mean effect is also not significant in the IV regression.
OLS further suggests that firms with a larger export share (which might be thought of as more productive firms) have a lower probability of exit. This effect disappears in IV. What is significant in both the OLS and IV estimation is the evidence on the asymmetric size effect of competition. In fact, the interaction between plant sales and Chinese competition abroad is negative and significant while the coefficient on the competition alone is positive and significant. An increase in competitive pressures on the export market makes Mexican exporters more likely to stop serving it, but this average effect is weaker for larger and more productive plants. Again in the first stage, the Sargan test does not suggest a problem of endogeneity, and the F-values are large.
Next we turn to investigate plant's responses on the intensive margin, ie. firm sales. Table 6 shows the OLS results where log domestic sales on plant level are the explained variables. First of all, we show in the first column that we do not find any average affect due to increased Chinese competition. However, when we include an interaction term between the degree of Chinese competition and plant size we find that while on average an increase in competition reduces plant-level sales, this effect is highly asymmetric, as the larger a plant is (in the regression measured by export sales) the less it responds by reducing its sales. In other words, Chinese competition pushes smaller and less productive plants to become even smaller while larger and which is commonly observed in similar contexts. See for example Lileeva and Trefler (2009) or Card (2001) . 15 For example: "'interaction instrument 1"' in the regression with the export share interaction is equal to the first instrument ("'China exp world-EU-US (t-1)"') times the lagged export share. more productive ones are less or not affected (column 4).
This result also holds qualitatively in the IV regressions (table 6) , while here two more interactions give significant results: Everything equal, plants that export more are less likely to exit from the market. We think of these plants as the more productive ones. The significant Herfindahl interaction suggests that markets with low level of competition are forced to reduce their sales more than plants in markets where they already operate under more competitive circumstances.
In the corresponding export market regressions for exporting plants (see table 7 for OLS and table 7 for IV) the same pattern emerges. We do not find an average effect of competition from China on the export markets in IV, but again we find in both OLS and IV that the impact of competition is asymmetric forcing smaller plants to reduce their exports sales while the larger ones' response is the opposite, as shown by the coefficient on the interaction term between Chinese competition on the export market and plant's sales (column 4 in both tables 7 and 7). The export share and Herfindahl interactions behave similarly to their domestic counterparts.
Quantile regressions
In the previous section we highlight an important asymmetric effect of size on exit and sales; namely that larger plants appear less effected by the adverse effects of the Chinese competition shock. However, in the previous model we impose a linear restriction on the heterogeneous effect to size. With these specifications we impose a linear relationship to size. To explore the nature of this asymmetric effect further, and also to allow for different effects at different levels, we perform quantile regressions and quantile IV regressions of the domestic size regression (see table 8 and table 9 ). 16 The results reveal a similar relationship with a negative distributional effect below the median and a positive effect above in OLS and IV. The relationship suggested by the quantile and quantile IV regression is increasing and concave, with strong differential changes at the lower end of the distribution.
In table 10 we use the ratio of white to blue collar workers as a measure of skill intensity of plants, and interact this measure with the log value of Chinese imports to Mexico. The coefficients on Chinese competition show again the tendency to disappear with size. We use the estimates of this table to draw the marginal effect of competition on a size-sales surface. This allows also to show that the impact of competition for firms with the same size but different skill shares, as well as the impact of holding the skill share constant and varying size. Figure 2 displays a size -skill surface. The figure suggests the effect of competition is most hurtful for the smallest and least skill intensive plants, and it increases when moving along either the size or the skill axis.
Intermediate inputs
So far we have not considered the effect of Chinese exports on inputs into Mexican manufacturing. This is another important test, since Mexican production might be influenced greatly due to changing prices of available inputs. This might be an additional influence driving plant exit and sales, and omitting it could cause the results presented to this point to be biased.
To account for this concern we generate a measure for the Chinese shares in inputs using the input-output tables for 2003 provided by INEGI and the Chinese trade values from COM-TRADE. 17 For the computation we weight each sector listed as input by its imports share, and the import share by the Chinese share in inputs for that sector. This is equal to the weighted sum of inputs imported from China at sectoral level where the weights are given by the coefficient of the input-output table. Total imports from China for a sector are positively correlated with Chinese imports for inputs to that sector as apparent from figure 5 . Table 15 provides the main regressions for plant exit and sales on the domestic and export market with plant size interactions with the addition of the measure for the Chinese importance in inputs and the interaction of this variable with plant size. Absent the addition of these two variables, the regressions provided in this table are identical to column 4 in tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, although we only provide the main variables of interest. While for some of the previously used coefficients the significance is reduced, qualitatively the results remain the same. The inputs variable mimics the results of Chinese imports; for small firms it increases the probability of exit and reduces sales, while the contrary holds for larger firms. This provides evidence that the larger plants are able to capture potential benefits of Chinese competition on the input markets better than their smaller competitors. This might be an important channel of why plants of different size are differently effected by competition, but other asymmetric elements remain present.
Product level
Next we investigate the extensive margin responses at product-level. Similar to the definition of plant exit, product drop at time t is equal to one if a product is manufactured at time t − 1 and t, but not at t + 1 and t + 2. 18 In these regressions we control again for log total imports, for the skill share, product market competition, the number of products of a firm, the export share of that product, and the share that the product has within the firm. Table 11 shows the overall drop of products as a consequence of Chinese competition. In this exercise we restrict the sample to those plants that produce more than one product only. In all product regressions we use plant-product fixed effects (such that product i produced in plant j differs from product i produced in plant k, and also from product l produced in plant j) and cluster robust standard errors by product categories (CMAP 8-digit). On average, we find a positive and significant effect of Chinese competition on the probability of exit in the OLS and the IV regressions. The second and forth column introduce an interaction with the share of products within plants. We think of a product with a larger share as a more profitable product ) or "core products" Neary 2008, Eckel et al 2009) . Also at product level we find evidence of selection effects as the impact of Chinese competition is asymmetric across products. Core products, or the ones that represent a larger a larger share of plant's sales, are less likely to be dropped. This heterogeneous responses at product level are confirmed in our IV regressions as shown in the fourth column of Table 11 .
We repeat the exercise for products in the export market, restricting the sample to exporting plants. The only change of structure is, that in these regressions we control additionally for the exit of plants from export. Product drop from export at time t is defined, as before, equal to one when a product is exported at time t − 1, in t, but not t + 1 and t + 2. In these regressions we control additionally for the exit of plants from all markets, and from export markets. The coefficients on the variable measuring the degree of Chinese competition in the US market are not significant when this variable is not interacted with the share of product on total plant sales. However, once more we find, both in OLS and IV regressions, evidence of reallocation and heterogeneous responses as the interaction between the degree of Chinese competition and the share of products sales is negative and significant. This indicates that core products are less likely to exit export market in the face of Chinese competition.
Next we investigate the responses along the intensive margin at product level. Table 13 confirms once more the "creative destruction" effect of competition and its reallocative consequences with less important products being forced to contract while "core" products expand. In column 1 of Table 13 we show there is actually no mean effect of competition, however when we introduce an interaction term between competition and product's share in column 2 we find that there is a significant asymmetric effect as while the coefficient on the variable capturing competition alone is negative and significant, this is counterbalanced by the interaction term pointing toward the fact that while competition forces a contraction along the intensive margin on average this effect is attenuated, and eventually reverted, for the "core products". This results are consistent across OLS and IV estimation (column 2 and 4 in Table 13 ). The only case when this "asymmetric" effect of competition does not emerge is Table 14 where we present the product-level response to the Chinese competition on the export market. In this case, both in the OLS and IV estimation, we find a significant and negative effect of Chinese competition on product-level sales.
The product regressions all include firm-product fixed effects and thus provide within plantproduct effects. A less strict setting is provided in the appendix, where we replace the plantproduct controls by industry control variables on CMAP-8 level. The results remain similar in sign but change in magnitude and level of significance.
Quantile regressions at product level can not be applied as a direct extension of the interacted column, since in the product regressions on sales the interactions are size shares and the outcomes size. When we perform a quantile regression of the interaction equation in table 13 (first column) this can thus not be directly compared to the second column, since the quantiles represent sales and not sales shares. In the appendix we provide these quantile results, which show that the effect of competition is significantly negative for small products, and positive for large products and not significantly different from zero for the medium ones.
Graphical representation
To summarize, we found strong impact of Chinese competition on exit and sales on plant and product level: Smaller plants and products are more likely to exit, and larger plants and "core products" are shielded more to the increasing competition. Further we present evidence that the competition induces firms to focus on their core products.
These relationships are summarized graphically in figures 3 and 4, where the x-axis shows sales centiles and the y-axis the marginal effect of competition for firms of that size, which is derived from the corresponding IV regressions using the coefficient on Chinese competition and on the interaction term multiplied by the corresponding size. The shapes and significance of these curves reflect the results previously described: larger plants and products are less effected by Chinese competition in terms of sales and exit probability. Magnitudes can be readily obtained from these graphs; for example the exit graph in figure 4 suggests that an increase of one percent of total imports of Chinese imports for a certain good translates into an increased exit probability of 0.5 for these products on the domestic market if they occupy 10 percent of plant sales, and it does not increase the exit probability for goods that occupy 90 percent of sales of a plant.
These graphs highlight the asymmetry of the impact. Note that for the computation of these graphs we use only the two coefficients that include our measure of the competition from China, which represents the estimated marginal effect. If however the partial derivative of any other coefficient with respect to competition is non-zero, the intercept of the graphs would be shifted.
Robustness
To account for robustness of our results we perform various robustness tests. First, in table 16 we rerun the results on plant level separately for the 20 percent of plants most affected by competition and the 20 percent least affected, measured by mean competition. This is a check of the plausibility of the estimation setup; we expect to find no effect in those plants in which Chinese imports are a small fraction of all competition, and a strong effect in the sample of plants that are strongly effected by Chinese competition. The tables shown are identical to the fourth column of tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 and these regressions are identical, but we only provide the main coefficients of interest. Most of the coefficients move away from zero in the subsample of the top 20 percent, while the effects are fully gone in the sample of bottom competition.
A second robustness check is provided in table 17, in the panel labeled "placebo". In this table we compare sales in the period of 1994 to 1998 to the future competition of plants, that is the competition that they would experience four years later. We believe that this future competition is unknown to plants and therefor meaningless to current behavior. The coefficients are all insignificant, which is another robustness check for the data. Similar tables for exit could not be computed, since we do not observe the plant-year specific competition of plants for plants that exit the sample.
It seems that Mexican policy makers were aware of the impact of Chinese competition, since they filed a large number of anti-dumping cases against China (the anti-dumping data was taken from Bown (2009)). A sixth of the products in our sample was subject to a successful Mexican anti-dumping complaint, which presents room for alternative interpretations for the findings. In particular, we face the problem that the endogeneity of the anti-dumping cases leads to a reverse causality of Mexican plant behavior on Chinese imports. To address these issues we repeat the plant level analysis only for those products with no anti-dumping case. These results are shown in the right panel in table 17. Our results remain similar in terms of size and significance.
Another concern is that specific developments in the technology of certain goods might influence the results, if they affect Chinese exports and Mexican firm behavior adversely. To confront this concern we include industry-year fixed effects into the main specifications. 19 The main results remain the same in size and significance, and are not significantly different in terms of magnitudes (see table 18 ).
Conclusions
The surge of Chinese exports provided us with a quasi-natural experiment to evaluate the impact of a surge in competition on the extensive and intensive margin both at plant and product-level. In this study, for the first time to our knowledge, we analyze the impact of such competitive pressures both on the domestic market as well as on the export market on sectoral, plant and product level.
We find that the surge of China challenges Mexican firms, and leads to plant exit, the loss of products and contraction. These effects are asymmetric along many dimensions: First, and most crucially, we show that indeed the effect of competition is highly asymmetric because while smaller and less productive plants are forced to shrink and exit from the market, this effect is attenuated and eventually reversed for larger and more productive plants. Second, we show that this process of "creative destruction" and market selection does not operate only at firm-but also at product-level. Third, such heterogeneous micro-level results are hidden by average effects at sectoral level pointing towards the need to use firm-and product level data and allow for heterogeneous effect through interaction terms.
These results highlight that the rise of Chinese exports influences existing production patterns, a question of great relevance to policy makers and firms worldwide. We show that while a crowding out effect is observed for less productive plants, the more productive larger plants can cope with this competition. These results, of course, do not tell us how the advent of China as a world trading power has affected Mexican welfare. They pay no regard to consumption benefits, nor to the extent to which competition in manufacturing has led to growth in other sectors. Even within manufacturing the extent of the aggregate shock is not always clear. What the results do show, however, is that resistance to Chinese competition is possible and that it entails 'moving up market'. The future of Mexican manufacturing appears to lie in greater efficiency and sophistication and that policy responses to Chinese competition should be in this direction rather than defensive. Thus, for example, policy should permit and facilitate change, rather than frustrate it by supporting failing firms. It should recognize the centrality of large and efficient firms to the response, than focusing on small and medium enterprises, it should promote skills and innovation by permitting them to earn high rewards when they succeed. These are not new messages -many policy-makers have advocated this at a firm or a sectoral, or even an economy-wide level -but this paper is the first to have produced proof for that proposition.
These results reinforce the messages emerging from the recent theoretical literature on heterogeneous firms spurred by the seminar paper of Melitz (2003) Still pending for future research agenda is to understand more in detail the mechanisms through which this "heterogeneous" responses operates at firm-and product-level, such as the role of innovation, firm organizational practices, skills and workers' training.
Appendix 1: Bias
As is often highlighted in the econometric literature, a fixed effects model with lagged dependent variables is likely biased. While the size of that bias for a model with a lagged dependent variable has been described (Nickell (1982) ), we are not aware of a formulation of the bias of an interacted lag dependent variable. To investigate this bias we undertake a simple simulation exercise.
We generate a panel data of 1000 firms over a time period of 10 years. We generate a simulated competition variable, which is distributed iid. uniformly between 0 and 1 (just as the Chinese imports share in the previous analysis is bounded by 0 and 1). In the first period sales are exogenously given and distributed iid. standard normally. In each further period we generate sales for firm i in period t as:
The error terms it are iid. standard normally distributed. We assume the parameters: β 1 = −0.5, β 2 = 0.5, β 3 = 0.5. After computing the data we estimate above model with the inclusion of firm fixed effects. To see the direction and size of the biases of the coefficients, we repeat described data generation and estimation 1000 times. Table 1 reports how often the estimated coefficient was significantly (at five percent level) below or above its true value, and how often we could not reject that it is equal to zero. This count reads as follows: The coefficient on the lagged sales is always below its true value of 0.5 (at five percent level of significance), and always above zero. The coefficient on lagged competition is 118 times above its true value of -0.5, three times below it and never zero. This suggests a modest attenuation bias. The interaction is over 180 times below its true value of 0.5, and two times above it. Hence we find evidence for an attenuation bias for all three coefficients that is most pronounced for lagged sales. The OLS sales regressions are thus potentially biased in a way that would lead us to underestimate the true size of the effects, and lower the significance of our estimates. US denote the shares of Chinese in total imports, Skill share the ratio of white to blue collar workers, and Share the share of sales of a given product within its firm. The first two columns report the results from an OLS regression, the mid two from IV and the last two columns show the corresponding first stages. Only exporting firms are considered. Robust standard errors, year and plant fixed effects applied throughout, stars denote significance at one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent level of significance. Robust standard errors used, stars denote significance at one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent level of significance. To mimic plant fixed effects all variables were demeaned. Stars denote significance at one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent level of significance. Q1 gives the quantile regression at the 10 th percentile. Table 9: Quantile IV regression -plant sales   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q6  Q7  Q8  Q9  log Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q6  Q7  Q8  Q9  lnLCHN Year and product fixed effects used throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at CMAP 8 product level, stars denote significance at one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent level of significance. A coeficient of < 0.001 represents coefficients that are too small for their first non-zero digit to appear numerically. 20.03 Note: The "Int" terms are the interactions of the China instruments with the product share. Product and year fixed effects as well as controls for firm exit and firm exit from export used throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at CMAP 8 product level, stars denote significance at one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent level of significance. A coeficient of < 0.001 represents coefficients that are too small for their first non-zero digit to appear numerically. Year and product fixed effects used throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at CMAP 8 product level, stars denote significance at one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent level of significance. 24.64 Note: The "Int" terms are the interactions of the China instruments with the product share. Robust standard errors are clustered at CMAP 8 product level, stars denote significance at one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent level of significance. A coeficient of < 0.001 represents coefficients that are too small for their first non-zero digit to appear numerically. Year and product fixed effects as well as controls for firm exit and firm exit from export used throughout. 35828  11414  39254  12139  35828  11414  39254 12139 Note: These regressions are identical to the fourth column of plant OLS regressions in tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, except that "inputs share" and "inputs share int." are also included. Only the main coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors are applied, stars denote significance at one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent level of significance. The interactions report the coefficient on the product of sales with the previous variable. These regressions are identical to the fourth column of plant OLS regressions in tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, except for the following modifications: In the first two regressions we report the regression for the years 1994-1998 with forward looking competition (for exit the forward competition can't be determined). The last four regressions show the results for the subsample of plants in sectors not affected by successful Mexican anti-dumping cases with respect to China. -0.00172 -0.00171 0.0353*** 0.0371*** (0.00170) (0.00170) (0.00963) (0.00962) Skill (t-1) -0.00786 -0.00793 0.529*** 0.522*** (0.00616) (0.00616) (0.0363) (0.0362) Herf (t-1)
42
<0.001 <0.001 1.578*** 1.537*** (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.338) (0.337) Nr. prod (t-1) -0.0119*** -0.0132*** -0.588*** -0.540*** (0.00236) (0.00237) (0.0113) (0.0114) Exp. share (t-1) -0.0292*** -0.0301*** 1.747*** 1.766*** (0.00806) (0.00807) (0.0537) (0.0540) Prod. share (t-1) <0.001*** <0.001* <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001* (<0.001 ) (<0.001 ) (<0.001 ) (<0.001 ) (<0.001 ) (<0.001 ) (<0.001 ) (<0.001 ) (<0.001) 47
